“As even Clayton himself has argued, there are “questions that science raises but cannot answer using its own resources.” In particular, he views quantum physics “as notorious for confronting us with philosophical questions that physics itself may never be able to answer…” This is where what Clayton calls a “hypothetical, pluralistic” metaphysics (like Barad and Whitehead’s panagentialism) can arguably play a crucial role. Just as Rubenstein has argued that contemporary multiverse theories are fallible but necessary metaphysical claims to make sense of physical cosmology, the mysteries of quantum entanglement, wave-particle duality, and the quantum vacuum also seem to call for metaphysical interpretations – at least for the time being. By definition, a meta-physics like panagentialism will go beyond physical evidence, although (ideally) without contradicting it. An adequate metaphysic, as Rubenstein puts it, must be “coherent, reliable and demonstrable…” Cobb has similarly argued that a plausible metaphysic must be both consistent and coherent – and of course, he has argued for decades that Whitehead’s panagentialism passes these tests.”

The above passage comes from a paper written by one of my favorite process thinkers, Austin Roberts. You can read the rest of his paper entitled Pneumatterings: The New Materialism, Whitehead and Theology here.

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Painting above by Karl Pilato

Tags:Baradnew materialismpanagentialismphillip claytonphysicswhitehead